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LECTURE
The Questions of Authority
FREDERICK SCHAUER*

It is no surprise that the issue of authority is so central to thinking about
law and legal institutions. Whether it be in the context of the authority of
a judge, or the authority of a case or statute, or the importance of
providing "authorities" in briefs and law review articles, a central feature
of law is the frequency with which the fact that someone or some institution has said something, rather than what they have said, makes a difference.
Sometimes, for instance, the Supreme Court says things that are silly, and
sometimes my friends say things that are sound, but much of how law
operates centers around the fact that even the silly things the Supreme
Court says count for more than the sound things my friends say.
Although numerous avenues of jurisprudential inquiry are suggested by
the role of authority in the operation of law, one avenue has dominated all
others. Since the Crito, 1 commentators on legal and political authority
have been preoccupied with one question-should those to whom allegedly authoritative directives are addressed take those directives as reasons
for action when the content of those directives differs from the addressees'
all-things-considered judgment about what to do? 2 In other words, if

* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Professorial Fellow of the Joan
Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University. This is the written version of the twelfth annual Philip
Hart Memorial Lecture, delivered at the Georgetown University Law Center on March 25,
1992. Earlier versions were presented at the Public Values Workshop of the John F.
Kennedy School of Government, at the Northwestern University School of Law, at the
Sapentia Series of the Dartmouth College Department of Philosophy, and at the American
Philosophical Association (Central Division). I am grateful to audiences at all of the above,
and to David Gilboa and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for their detailed comments.
1. Plato, Crito, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 33 (Benjamin Jowett trans. & William Chase
Greene ed., 1927).

2. For a sample of the enormous modern literature directed to this question see generally
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JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW:
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(1979);

JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); ALAN JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES
AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979); PHILIP E. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW (1984); ROBERT
PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970); Heidi M. Hurd, ChallengingAuthority, 100
YALE

L.J. 1611 (1991); M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82

YALE L.J. 950 (1973); Symposium, The Works of Joseph Raz, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 731 (1989).
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authority is content-independent, 3 and thus a function of the source of the
directive rather than its substance then why, other than fear of sanctions,
should anyone obey authority?
The question whether there is a prima facie moral obligation to obey the
law is important. Nor should it come as a surprise that this question
generates so much attention in a country known for the pervasiveness of its
legal institutions, and which counts within its jurisprudential heritage both
the rejection of the "I was just following orders" argument at Nuremberg
and the current condemnation of those judges who, in the 1850s, enforced
without moral interposition the horror that was the Fugitive Slave Laws.4
Still, the question whether the subject of law should treat the fact of law as
morally relevant is only one of a number of questions that might be asked
about legal authority. Accordingly, my aim here is not to provide one
more answer to the frequently asked question whether there is a prima
facie moral obligation to obey the law, but rather to try to suggest that
there are questions that are not being asked but should be. In taking this
approach, and in believing that I can do more good by asking new questions than by presuming to provide any newness in answering a question
that has occupied many of the greatest thinkers for literally thousands of
years, I leave for other times anything but the most tentative answers to
the questions I will pose.
I. THE QUESTION OF OFFICIAL OBLIGATION

The traditional question of legal obligation has been preoccupied with
the role of the citizen and dominated by the images of Socrates and the
defendants at Nuremberg. Do I, as a citizen of a political state that both
has a legal system and is in some sense defined by that legal system, have
an obligation to obey the laws of my own state that I would not have with
respect to the laws of another country? Although when travelling in
France I have good prudential reasons for obeying French law, many
would say that I have no content-independent and nonprudential reasons
for taking the fact of there being a French law as morally relevant to my
decision about what to do. They might still, however, maintain that as a
3. On content-independence, see H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 127-61, 220-68
(1982) (explaining content-independence in terms of commands, whereby the reason for a
subject to take an action is grounded in the notion that she is commanded to take such an
action, not in the nature or character of the action to be done); RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM,

supra note 2, at 35-37 (explaining content-independence in terms of reasons

whereby a reason is content-independent if there is no direct connection between the reason
and the action for which it is a reason); Gerald Postema, The Normativity of Law, in ISSUES IN
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 81, 98 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987).

4. See ROBERT
150-54 (1975).

M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
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citizen of the United States making a decision in the United States I would
have moral reasons for taking the fact of American law as morally relevant
to my decision.5
Even when the citizen's citizenship is not the relevant feature, the focus
generally remains on the "ordinary" individual who is putatively subject to
legal authority. 6 Thus, although under a perspective that views legal
obligation as arguably emanating from law as a solution to a coordination
problem, there are few relevant differences between the citizen and any
other law-subject, the object of attention remains the person who, independent of role or position, happens to be the addressee of a legal directive.7
Many laws, however, are addressed not to citizens but to officials. 8 In
this case a far less frequently asked question arises: do officials have moral
obligations to obey the law solely by virtue of their role? Although some of
the limited literature on this subject tends to use the term "role morality"
as the marker for this range of questions,9 I prefer the term "positional
obligation" coined by John Simmons.1" This latter term clearly suggests
the question whether holding some role or position imposes upon the
holder obligations that she would not otherwise have.
5. The relevance of citizenship (or its equivalent) is central to social contract or consent
theories regarding moral obligations to obey the law. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
(Bobbs-Merrill ed., 1958); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge
University Press ed. 1960); Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, in MAN AND CITIZEN (B. Gert ed.,
1972).
6. See supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., John Finnis, The Authority of Law in the Predicamentof Contemporary Social
Theory, I NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 115, 133-37 (1984); Gerald J. Postema,
Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 176-203
(1982); Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 139, 154-55 (1984); see also EDNA ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977). Cf. Leslie Green, Law, Co-ordination and the Common Good, 3
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 312-22 (1983) (subjects of authority have no obligation to obey
the law); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1015 (1989) (same); Donald H. Regan, Reasons, Authority, and the
Meaning of "Obey": Further Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law, 3 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1990) (subjects of authority have no obligation to obey that authority).
8. Under some jurisprudential perspectives all laws are addressed to sanction-imposing
officials and only indirectly to the citizenry. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF
LAW AND STATE 93-110 (Anders Wedberg, trans., 1945); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF
LAW 168-74, 191-92 (Max Knight ed., 1967). Here I am assuming that some laws are
directed primarily to citizens while others, the ones which are my immediate concern in Part
I, are directed only to officials. On this distinction, see generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625
(1984); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369 (1989); Edward L. Rubin, Modem Statutes, Loose Canons and the Limits of Practical
Reason: A Response to Farberand Ross, 45 VAND. L. REV. 579 (1992).
9. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) ("role
morality" allows officials to avoid making ultimate moral judgments).
10. SIMMONS, supra note 2, at 16-23.
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To say "would not otherwise have" is not to resolve whether an addressee of the law qua addressee or a citizen qua citizen has a moral
obligation to obey the law. Regardless of the answer to that question,
however, we can still ask whether officials have different or additional
obligations solely because of their role or position. In other words, even if
there is no obligation to obey the law, not even prima facie, it might be
that officials qua officials still have an obligation to obey the law in general,
or to obey those laws directed to them.1 1 Moreover, even if there is a
general obligation to obey the law, that obligation is widely understood to
be prima facie rather than conclusive; and as long as an obligation is prima
facie, it has a dimension of weight' 2 that can be greater or lesser. Consequently, even if all citizens have an obligation to obey the law, officials
might have a greater obligation, meaning that the official obligation would
have more force in the face of competing 13considerations than a parallel
nonofficial obligation to obey the same law.
There thus emerge two related but rarely asked questions. First, if there
is no general obligation to obey the law, is there still a positional obligation
on the part of officials to obey the law? Second, if there is a general prima
facie obligation to obey the law, is the strength of that obligation greater
when an official is the obligee? But one of the things that makes these
questions both difficult and distinct is the difference between consenting to
be a citizen and consenting to be an official. For most of us, the idea of
11. The difference between obligations imposed by general laws and those imposed by
laws directed solely to officials is worth highlighting. Officials are people as well as officials.
Thus they are within the class of addressees of laws directed at the population generally, and
they are within a smaller class of addressees of laws directed to them as officials. One

question is whether as officials they have greater obligations than others (or obligations
where others have none) to obey laws directed to them as members of the class of people
generally. Thus, if there is no moral obligation to obey the law, I have no moral obligation to

obey the law when doing so would serve no moral purpose, and so I have no obligation to
stop at a "Stop" sign when doing so would serve no direct or indirect moral purpose. See
Donald H. Regan, Law's Halo, 4, 16-17, 24-25 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 15 (1986). But if I am an

official of the state, then it might be that I have a special obligation to obey all of the state's
laws and would have a moral obligation to stop at the "Stop" sign, even when doing so

served no moral purpose, solely because of my positional obligations. This issue, which turns
out to have considerable political salience when we think about officials' violations of what
some think are minor laws (e.g., laws prohibiting possession or use of marijuana), is different
from the question whether officials (who might, even as officials, have no obligation to obey
general laws) have positional obligations to obey those laws directed to them, just because
they are officials.

12. For an explanation of the "dimension of weight," see RONALD
26-27 (1977).

DWORKIN, TAKING

RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

13. If citizens qua citizens had an absolute or nonoverridable obligation to obey the law,

then this possibility would not arise because there can be no obligation more powerful than
an absolute one. But because no one maintains that a citizen's obligation, even if there is
one, is absolute, then the possibility of an obligation of greater stringency based on the
identity of the obligee is distinct.
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"consenting" to be a subject of the laws, or of "consenting" to be a citizen,
is more metaphorical than real. And because few of us "signed" anything
that looks like a social contract in any but the most attenuated sense, the
absence of explicit and conscious consent under conditions of genuine
choice has often been thought to be fatal to a consent or social contract
theory of legal obligation.' 4
Most officials, however, (excluding the military conscript) have consented not just metaphorically but actually, knowingly, explicitly, and under circumstances of comparatively free choice. Moreover, their consent
commonly takes the form of an oath of office, and that oath of office
commonly makes explicit reference to a law-directed obligation. All state
and federal officials in the United States, for example, are constitutionally
required to take an oath "to support this Constitution."15
One of the problems with this and other equivalent oaths is that they are
ambiguous about a question of legal theory that could, under one interpretation, cause the issue we are now discussing to dissolve. I want to avoid
terms like "positivism" and "natural law" because they carry too much
contested jurisprudential and political baggage. Nevertheless, we can
contrast two different positions. One position employs phrases like "the
law" or "the Constitution" to refer only to indications of written documents like reported cases, statements in treatises regarding the "black
letter" law, statutes, regulations, and the text of the Constitution. In other
words, this position identifies a discrete subset of social materials, and
refers to that discrete subset as "the law" or "the Constitution., 1 6
The opposing position would not start with a set of books published by
the West Publishing Company or the Government Printing Office, but
rather with the practice of legal decisionmaking in general, and adjudication in particular, as it exists in the United States in 1992. Inspired by
Ronald Dworkin, this position resists, as a descriptive matter and possibly
14. See SIMMONS, supra note 2, at 57-100 (discussing weaknesses in social contract theory
of legal obligation).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; see

SANFORD

LEVINSON,

CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH

91-94

(1988). There are interesting questions that might be asked about the word "support,"
because it arguably includes affirmative duties, and not just a duty not to contravene the
Constitution. For my purposes, however, I will take this language to be the equivalent of an
oath to follow or obey the Constitution.
16. Although I am wary of the distorting effects of words with widely divergent meanings
and thus do not in the text describe this position as "positivism," it closely resembles what I
and others would think of as a position quite compatible with traditional legal positivism.
See generally JOSEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 37 (1979); Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pariah,in
THE AUTONOMY OF LAW:

ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM

(Robert George ed., forthcoming

1993); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645
(1991); Frederick Schauer, The Rules of Jurisprudence: A Reply, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
839 (1991).
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a normative one as well, the demarcation between law and nonlaw by the
contents of a set of books. 7 Rather, so this position maintains, legal
decisionmakers in the United States can and do decide cases according to
an undifferentiated set of (technically) legal, political, social, and moral
sources. And if this is so, then morality is inextricably a part of every legal
decision,1 8 and moral inspection a necessary condition for every application of law.
It should be apparent that this latter jurisprudential view makes the
official's oath irrelevant to the question we are now considering. If one
can, should, or must refuse to follow the West Publishing Company or
Government Printing Office law in the name of morality, and in doing so
still be doing "law," then an oath-based obligation to obey the law, or an
oath-based obligation to obey the Constitution, is still consistent with
disregarding certain aspects of West Publishing Company law in the name
of morality. It turns out therefore, that, under this latter jurisprudential
perspective, the view that there is a moral obligation to obey the law and
the view that there is no moral obligation to obey the law are extensionally
equivalent. If one can disregard the West Publishing Company law in the
service of morality while still operating under the rubric of "law," then
saying that there is a moral obligation to obey the law is equivalent to
saying, tautologically, that there is a moral obligation to be moral. Under
this view, taking the oath of obedience to the law is redundant of otherwise
existing moral obligations.
Ultimately, therefore, the only interesting questions about the possibility
of an official's positional obligation to obey the law presuppose the prior,
or non-Dworkinian view, pursuant to which there is a field of official
directives that some would call "law" even if their indications were morally
undesirable. 19 And here we might note the contribution to this debate by
17. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 410 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 184-86 (1977). For present purposes the similarities between Dworkin and other

theorists are more important than the differences, and there are other views that are
relevantly similar to Dworkin's. See

MELVIN

A.

EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON

156 (1988) (arguing that common law cases are decided under a unified methodology in
which social propositions, such as morality, policy, and experience, are relevant, and are
sometimes supported by or in conflict with doctrinal propositions, such as statutes and
LAW

common law precedents); David 0. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial
Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 116-19, 125 (1988); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law
Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279, 286 (1985).

18. That is, morality is not just a part of the interpretation of those legal items that
contain a moral reference, such as "equal protection of the laws," "cruel and unusual

punishment," and "unreasonable searches and seizures," but is an integral part of all legal
determinations.
19. Note that I am not claiming that one or the other of these positions is correct,
although I do have views on the subject.

Rather I am claiming only that the standard

formulation of the "obligation to obey the law" question presupposes the acceptance of one
of these views and the rejection of the other.
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that prominent jurisprudential scholar, Fawn Hall, whose enduring contribution to legal philosophy came during the Iran-Contra Committee's
investigation. In explaining the actions she took as Oliver North's secretary, she said that "sometimes you have to go above the written law, I
believe.", 20 In so identifying some conceptual space between what the
written law requires and what one ought to do, Fawn Hall reformulated
the very presupposition I am discussing here. So if we are dealing with
what Fawn Hall called "written law," or what Ruth Gavison calls "first
stage law,",21 or what the traditional positivist simply calls "law," and if we
stipulate that this thin conception of law is just what law is, then taking an
oath to obey it might plausibly make a moral difference.
We have now further clarified our question: if the words "law" or
"Constitution" in an oath refer to law in this thin sense such that disobedience to the law in the name of morality is a conceptual possibility, then
does taking an oath to support that law create an obligation to obey it
where none would have otherwise existed, or create a stronger
obligation
22
oath?
the
take
not
do
who
those
for
exists
otherwise
than
What makes an oath different from any other official statement is that
we consider the oath a species of a promise. Perhaps official obligation is
different from citizen obligation because by taking the oath the official has
made a promise, thus taking on additional obligations just like anyone else
who has made a promise. If promises create obligations, 23 then promising

20. Dan Morgan & Walter Pincus, Hall Testifies of Necessity 'To Go Above Written Law,'
WASH. POST, June 10, 1987, at Al.
21. Ruth Gavison, Comment, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 21, 30-31

(Ruth Gavison ed. 1987).
22. In this formulation I assume not only the thinner definition of "law," but mutual
understanding on the part of society as oath-giver and the official as oath-taker about what
the oath means. Thus I assume away the quite distinct possibility, especially in the United

States, that the moral component of the word "law" is sufficiently well-understood that
taking an oath to "obey the law" is not to take an oath to subjugate one's best moral
judgment. If this is true then a judge who in the name of morality refused to enforce the
Fugitive Slave Laws was not violating his oath. But nor was Fawn Hall, except insofar as the

violation of the oath came about as a function of acting immorally in an objective sense
rather than acting immorally in the subjective sense of morality as perceived by the agent.
This is a real difference, but it now is quite a bit removed from the question of what, if
anything, is added by the oath. If taking an oath, or making a promise, obliges you to do the
right thing regardless of whether you perceived it to be right or not, then the oath adds
nothing. The argument from the oath presupposes some degree of intentionality, so if we do
not distinguish judges from national defense secretaries, as well we might, and if we do not
fault the judge for violating his oath in refusing to obey the Fugitive Slave Laws, then we
should not fault Fawn Hall for violating her oath in going above the written law, although we
can still fault her for acting immorally.
23. The philosophical literature addressing this issue is enormous. See generally CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); WILLIAM DAVID Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
(1930); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
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to obey the law would create an obligation for the official making the
promise that would not otherwise have existed for that official, and would
plausibly create a stronger obligation even if one existed prior to the
promise.
Although viewing the oath as a promise explains how the oath can
create an obligation, or increase the stringency of a preexisting obligation,
it does not explain what seems to be a puzzling position in much of the
literature. A widely held view is that if you hold a position whose positional requirements direct you to obey or enforce an immoral law, or
commit an immoral act in the process of obeying or enforcing the law, then
if you properly choose the moral course you should also resign your
position. If morality requires you to avoid the obligations of "your station
and its duties,""a then you cannot morally continue to hold your position
while being unable to fulfill your positional obligations. If having the law
changed is not an option, your only option is to resign.
But why should you resign? Assuming that you do have positional
obligations, and assuming that they are overridden by general moral obligations, it does not seem to follow that resignation is morally necessary. If I
make a promise, and if the obligation to keep that promise comes into
conflict with an even stronger obligation that requires that I not keep the
promise, the former obligation is overridden by the latter. But that does
not mean that my initial promise was unavailing: not only did the initial
promise raise the threshold for the weight necessary for some other
obligation to determine what should be done, but the overridden promise
does not evaporate.2 6 If on Monday I promise to pick up your mail every
day for the following week while you are away, and if on Wednesday I
cannot do so because I must rush an injured relative to the hospital, am I
relieved of the obligation to pick up your mail on Thursday and Friday? I
would think not, because a promise to engage in multiple performances
does not terminate upon failure to perform on one occasion. By the same
token, if I have by virtue of a promise (the official's oath) agreed to obey
the law in all cases, the fact that that obligation is overridden in one case
does not automatically indicate that the obligation terminates forever.
(1969); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990); Jan Narveson, Promising,

Expecting and Utility, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 207 (1971); Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in
LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 210 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977); Jerome Schneewind,
A Note on Promising, 17 PHIL. STUD. 33 (1966).
24. F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 160 (2d ed. 1927).
25. For an example of the view that resignation is the only option if one violates the
positional duties of one's office, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
14 (1991).
26. Here I expand on ideas first set out in a prior article. See generally Frederick Schauer,

Can Rights Be Abused? 31 PHIL. Q. 225 (1981).
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Now of course there is a difference between my obligation to pick up the
mail and an official's obligation to obey the law. In the case of picking up
the mail, the obligation arguably persists because it is for the benefit of the
promisee, although the override was for my benefit as promisor. Nevertheless, once we understand the idea of overridable obligations that survive
the override despite being overridden in a particular case, we see that
there is at least no logical inconsistency in an official viewing the obligations of her own oath as overridden in one case and still not resigning.
Indeed, even if the oath were taken to be absolute, such that the official
who broke it can be said to have violated the oath, 27 it is not clear that the
punishment for that violation, whether such punishment be socially imposed or self-imposed, would necessarily have to be termination of the
official's office.
If the question is seen as one of conscience rather than as one of
punishment, the same result follows. Assuming no attempt by the official
to hide the act,2 8 conscience would seem to allow the official to continue to
hold the position so long as she acted on the assumption that the obligation was genuine. As long as the official's oath raises the threshold for
acting contrary to the obligation above what it would have been without
the oath, then an official who persists with that raised threshold understanding of her role need not as a matter of conscience resign even after a
specific case in which the concerns of morality nevertheless surpassed the
raised threshold.
But suppose the oath does not exist, or is, as discussed above, sufficiently
indeterminate as to jurisprudential content such that it cannot be equated
with a promise to obey the written law. In this case might there still be an
official obligation to obey the written law? Without the benefit of being
able to rely on the oath as promise, the issue becomes solely one of the
soundness, or lack thereof, of the place that role morality or positional
obligation assumes in considering the responsibilities toward the law of
officials qua officials.
Now it might be that the positional obligation of officials is supererogatory, requiring them to do more than might otherwise be required-some
acts that would be morally optional for citizens might be obligatory for
27. This language incorporates Alan Gewirth's typology pursuant to which obligations,

rights, or rules are infringed when they are not carried out. When an infringement is
justifiable the obligation is overridden; when an infringement is not justifiable the obligation
is violated. Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights? 31 PHIL. 0. 1 (1981). For similar
structures, see Robert Nozick, Moral Complicationsand Moral Structures, 13 NAT. L. FORUM
1 (1968); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 45, 47-50

(1977).
28. This.may be a bigger assumption than necessary. If all obligations are overridable,
then the obligation of official candor to the official's constituents can also be overridden.
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officials. Just as we expect the captain to be last to board the lifeboats and
thus "go down with the ship," so might we also expect officials, as captains
of the ships of state, to maintain a different balance between the prudential and the moral than we expect of those holding no official position.
But our issue is different. We are concerned with an aspect of role
morality or positional obligation pursuant to which the role-holders, because of the role, might refrain from what would otherwise be morally
obligatory acts, or would be compelled to take what would otherwise be
morally prohibited acts. Once put this way it is far from clear that there is
a plausible argument for official obligation to obey the law in the face of
countervailing moral imperatives, that differs from the arguments for
citizen obligation to obey the law in the face of countervailing moral
imperatives. Because my aim here is primarily to raise questions rather
than to give answers, however, I want to discontinue any further pursuit of
the question whether officials, because they are officials, have an obligation
to obey the written law that surpasses the obligation, if any, of other
citizens. Additionally, I want to shift away from this issue because there
are two quite different ways of asking the question "Is there an obligation?"
Usually when we inquire "Is there an obligation?", we are asking a
question of moral ontology, pursuant to which we believe that there is a
moral fact of the matter that we are attempting to discover. This was the
type of inquiry pursued in Part I, and is the type pursued by most people
who ask questions about moral obligation to the law or the state.
But "Is there an obligation?" might also be asked as an empirical
question in an attempt to discover the attitudes of members of a society,
the incentives that exist within that society, and the norms of behavior that
a society creates and enforces. From this standpoint when we say "Is
there?" we have less theoretical, but no less important, aspirations, looking for the extant norms within a given culture rather than for the deep
truths of moral metaphysics. Thus, we can ask the questions "Is there a
citizen obligation to obey the law?" and "Is there an official obligation to
obey the law?" as empirical questions about the norms in this society at
this time. It is to this range of questions that I now turn.
II. OFFICIAL OBLIGATION AS AN EMPIRICAL QUESTION
In order to try to answer the empirical question "Is there a general or
official obligation to obey the law in the United States in 1992?", we
should recall the essential qualification of content-independence, the notion that the concept of authority in general and legal authority in particular is independent of the content of the pertinent directive. Thus, the
question becomes whether the fact of legal authority simpliciter is taken to
be relevant in the elaboration and enforcement of social norms.
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One hypothesis is that there is no social obligation, or social perception
of a moral obligation, to obey the law qua law, even prima facie. But once
we understand content-independence, we understand as well that this view
does not mean that one is morally free to murder, to rob, to rape, or to
trade securities on inside information. What is wrong with murder, robbery, rape, and insider trading is not that they violate the law, but that they
are activities that are perceived by society to be morally wrong,29 and thus
it would be considered morally wrong to engage in them independent of
the existence of a legal prohibition. Under this hypothesis, the state adds
nothing to the moral calculus by making these activities illegal, and society
would be just as willing to condemn or extra-legally sanction those who
lawfully commit these acts as it would those who commit them in violation
of the law. Conversely, under this hypothesis neither the state's prohibition of that which is not perceived to be morally wrong, nor its compulsion
of that which is not morally required, makes a difference. Consequently,
making a form of behavior legally obligatory does not create a social
perception of an obligation beyond the obligations, if any, attaching to the
substance of the underlying moral prohibitions.
I have tried to frame this hypothesis carefully because serious empirical
inquiry can try to determine whether it is true or false only if the hypothesis itself is framed properly. Unfortunately, the existing empirical work on
the subject of the extant norms of obedience to law3 ° has not sufficiently
recognized the importance of the dimension of content-independence. As
a result, such empirical work has been inclined to look for the reasons,
other than fear of sanctions or hope for rewards, why people would obey
laws that they believe desirable but whose obedience would not be in their
self-interest. This inquiry is important to understanding the relationship
of a society to its law, but it is somewhat different than the question that
lies at the center of the issue of legal authority. If we are interested in
whether people obey the law qua law, then we need to examine the
question not in the context of good laws that we would just as soon not
obey, like tax laws or "Keep Off the Grass" signs, but rather in the context
of bad laws that are nevertheless the law, or good laws whose purposes
would not be served by obeying them on some particular occasion.3 1
29. Although I believe that they are morally wrong, the formulation in the text, suggesting

that they may be merely wrong as a matter of social convention, is the one most suited to the
social/empirical focus that is the topic of this section.
30. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY Do PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW? 40-68 (1990).
31. These are two different issues. Because rules are actually, or potentially, under-and

over-inclusive vis-a-vis their background justifications, even good rules may, under certain
circumstances, generate bad results. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 31-34

(1991).
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Thus, empirical inquiry that would adequately explore this hypothesis
ought ideally to focus on two related questions, each of which could be
asked for ordinary citizens and for officials. The first question would
address whether, and if so why, subjects of laws who perceive such laws to
be immoral, wrong-headed, unsound, or silly nevertheless obey those laws,
even when no sanctions attach to disobedience. The second question
would be similar to the first, but it would focus not on bad laws, but on
good laws in the context of situations in which no purpose would be served
by obedience. As an example of this latter issue, consider why it is that,
based on my own casual observations, the Viennese will not walk against a
"Don't Walk" 32 sign even when it is clear beyond doubt that neither traffic
nor police officers are anywhere to be seen, whereas most Americans (and
not take the presence of
all residents of Cambridge, Massachusetts) would
33
the sign as anything other than a challenge?
The answer to these empirical inquiries is likely to be different for
citizens and officials. Consistent with my general themes here, however, I
want to focus on the officials, asking whether, legal punishment or other
sanction aside, there now exists in the United States a social norm obliging
officials to treat the fact of law as relevant to their decisions. And although, as with most empirical questions, the use of anecdotes is a highly
unsatisfactory way in which to answer an empirical question about large
group tendencies, anecdotes may still suggest that there is a real question
worth investigating more systematically. Let me offer, then, a set of
anecdotes suggesting that despite the widely held view that this is the most
legalistic of countries, it is also one in which officials are often not expected to take the law seriously in its own right, but are instead rewarded
or punished according to whether they simply "do the right thing."

32. Actually, "Halt!"
33. The dynamics are slightly more complex than the text indicates. Although I have

spent quite a bit of time in Vienna (and in Finland, where the same phenomenon exists), I
have spent no time lurking in dark corners watching pedestrians at intersections, and thus
virtually all of my observations have taken place in a context in which the person I was
observing knew I was there. Insofar as there is social pressure to obey the law (for example,
based again on personal observation, crossing against a "Halt!" sign in the former German
Democratic Republic would generate the same amount of overt verbal condemnation as
would smoking a cigar in a Berkeley vegetarian restaurant), then my presence as observer
might have had a deterrent effect not present for the lone pedestrian. Thus, one question is
whether citizens have truly internalized the value, in which case they would be inclined to
obey even when there is no sanction in the form of condemnation or otherwise. Another
question is whether a society has internalized the value, such that there would be social

pressure even on an individual who has not internalized the value to obey even when the
appliers of the pressure would agree that no point would be served by obeying in this
particular case.
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Consider first the controversy surrounding the 1988 presidential election
regarding Michael Dukakis's veto, while Governor of Massachusetts, of a
bill that would have compelled all teachers in the state to lead the Pledge
of Allegiance on a daily basis. 34 Relying on an advisory opinion of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 35 and on West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Bamette,36 Governor Dukakis explained his veto in terms of
constitutional compulsion, an explanation widely understood to be a major
political gaffe. 37 Viewing this explanation as a political mistake, however,
presupposes a political environment in which we do not expect our political figures to defer to constitutional constraint because of the fact of,
rather than the substance of, the constitutional constraint.
Other examples of this same phenomenon abound, each presenting an
example in which the authoritativeness of a formal rule or judicial opinion
carried less political weight than did disagreement with its content. From
Lincoln, 38 to Roosevelt, 39 to Meese, 4° prominent political officials have
argued with some political success that Supreme Court opinions they
believed erroneous should be given limited effect by other branches of
government. Although the issue is controversial, the very fact that numerous federal agencies have a "nonacquiescence" policy regarding their
treatment of federal courts of appeals decisions with which they disagree is
strong evidence that agency interposition of its own best judgment in the

34. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Barnette and Johnson: A Tale of Two Opinions, 75 IOWA

L. REV. 417, 417 (1990) (while Dukakis's veto may have been constitutionally correct, the
voting public preferred Bush's criticism of Dukakis's veto); L. Gordon Crovitz, Letter, AM.
LAW., Apr. 1989, at 15 (defending his critique of Dukakis's veto); Dennis J. Hutchinson, And
Besides Gut Feelings, George?, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1989, at 25 (mentioning Bush's criticism
of Dukakis's veto); David Whitman, Behind the Pledge Flap: The Nasty History of Our Oath of

Allegiance, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1988, at C1 (discussing irony of conservative President who
supports judicial restraint and individual freedom, yet criticizes opponent who vetoed law
requiring recitation of Pledge of Allegiance).
35. Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 363 N.E.2d 251 (1977).
36. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
37. See Tom Wicker, It's Still Bush League, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1988, at A35 ("too

legalistic").
38. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (12th ed. 1991) (in a speech Lincoln

opposed the Dred Scott decision and in his First Inaugural Address he questioned the extent
to which Supreme Court decisions are binding on the general population and other branches
of the federal government).
39. Id. at 23-24 (in both a letter and a proposed speech FDR argued that government

action and legislation must go forward, even when the constitutionality of such action and
legislation has previously been raised by the Supreme Court).
40. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981-83 (1987)

(drawing a distinction between Constitution and constitutional law, arguing that former is
supreme law of land while latter is Supreme Court interpretations of former and as such not
binding on the other coequal branches of government).
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face of contrary court decisions is not a politically unacceptable act.4" The
Cincinnati obscenity prosecution of Dennis Barrie and the Institute of
Contemporary Art for displaying an exhibition of the photographs of
Robert Mapplethorpe was a total nonstarter as a matter of constitutional
law,42 but those in charge of initiating the prosecution seem to have
suffered no negative political consequences as a result of their actions.
Nor do Clint Eastwood, Eliot Ness, or numerous other television police
officers suffer negative professional consequences for proceeding without a
warrant or failing to give a Miranda warning as long as they apprehend the
actual culprit. Moreover, there is some evidence to support the proposition that officials will be considered liable for damages when in following a
plainly lawful and plainly reasonable rule they do not override that rule in
order to make the best decision possible under the actual circumstances of
a particular event.4 3
These and numerous other anecdotes mesh well with a broader jurisprudential environment in which scholars can, without feeling sheepish, urge
courts to update statutes that they feel are obsolete,4 4 and in which
numerous legal institutions have a less formal understanding of their role
41. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by FederalAdministrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) (addressing constitutionality of agency nonacquiescence, and evaluating its costs and benefits). Although there is a difference between those
who deny an obligation to obey the law and those who deny an obligation to obey some
court's interpretation of it, in practice the issues are virtually identical. The question in both
is one of deference to another institution, whether it is the "law" in one case and "some
court" in the other, when one's own best judgment is at odds with that of the institution.
Still, I do not deny that although the claims may be close to extensionally equivalent, it is
politically necessary to characterize them in terms of resisting the decisions of the courts
rather than resisting the law.
42. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987) (determination of literary, artistic,
political, and scientific value is to be based on national rather than local standards); Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 308 (1977) (same); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974)
(holding unanimously that a state court may not attempt to reach sexually explicit
"mainstream" material under the obscenity laws). The jury acquittal in Cincinnati forestalled any actual appellate review of the constitutionality of the prosecution, but I have
little doubt that Mapplethorpe's photographs had garnered sufficient mainstream critical
acclaim to surpass any plausible application of the "serious artistic value" standard.
43. For a particularly vivid example, in which school officials were held liable in tort for
negligence despite having followed a reasonable rule prohibiting school officials from transporting injured students, see Ronald J. Allen, Foreword: The Nature of Discretion, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2-4 (1984).

44. See generally GUIDO

CALABRESI,

A

COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982).

See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21,
56-61 (1988) (statute should be interpreted as if it had been recently enacted by employing
familar tools of statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481, 1496-97 (1987) (statutes should be interpreted
"dynamically"); Donald L. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the JudicialProcess: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in FederalBanking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 675 (1987)
(when statues become obsolete, courts become less faithful to legislative intent); Note,
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than is the case in many other countries.4 5 In other words, both political
events and scholarly analyses lend some support to the proposition that
American legal and political officials have greater social and political
authorization to depart from the specific indications of written law in their
attempts to achieve the best result than might at first be apparent in such a
highly law-soaked culture, and than might be the case for their counterparts in other legal cultures.
None of this is to say that there might not be evidence, anecdotal or
otherwise, inclining toward the opposite conclusion. And my investigation
is sufficiently unsystematic that it might be that any such countervailing
evidence is stronger than the evidence on which I rely, leading to the
conclusion that political and legal officials4 6 in the United States, more
than in other legal cultures, have a social and political obligation to obey
the formal indications of the law even when their best all-thingsconsidered judgment would lead them to do otherwise.
But if I am right, and the evidence from the American legal and political
culture inclines toward rather than away from the social and political
permissibility of official moral and policy-based interposition against suboptimal indications of the law in a formal sense, then Fawn Hall's statement
is well within the American political tradition. It is true that the crowd
gasped when she made her claims of the right to go above the written law,
and it is true that in response to those gasps she retreated a bit, saying that
"[m]aybe that's not correct; it's not a fair thing to say." 4 7 But perhaps the
gasp was a bit hasty, and the retreat a trifle premature. However politically predictable the gasp, and however tactically necessary the retreat, the
fact remains that the entire Iran-Contra affair as it has been played out in
public has not been a political plus for its chief protagonists. And as long
as that is the case, it remains quite possible that Fawn Hall was condemned far less for an attitude of disrespect for the law than for the fact
that she was on the wrong side of a public policy debate. Had she gone
above the written law in the service of what society either at the time or
subsequently determined to be the correct side of the debate, it is likely
Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretationin the Supreme Court,
95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 913 (1982).
45. See generally P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987); D. NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING
STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1991).
46. My conflation of the political and the legal is perhaps a bit too quick. Although it is
not my agenda here, it is possible to maintain that legal officials, including judges, prosecutors, and perhaps all lawyers, have a positional obligation to obey the law that is different
from and greater than the positional obligations of public officials with less law-specific
responsibilities.
47. Ed Magnuson, Shredded Policies,ArrogantAttitudes, TIME, June 22, 1987, at 21.
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that her willingness to go above the written law in the service of that
position would have been less subject to condemnation than standard
platitudes about respect for law might indicate.
As I indicated above, my unsystematic empirical speculations should not
be interpreted as making any stronger claim than that there is an issue to
be investigated and a question to be answered. Once the question is
properly clarified, we can recognize it as one that requires us to determine
the extent to which, if at all, obedience to law as a value is itself rewarded,
or lack of such value is punished, within a given political and legal culture.
With this as the question-the empirical question of legal authority-it is
far from clear that there "is" an obligation to obey the law, even prima
facie, on the part of American political officials in the United States at this
time.
That there may be less of a culturally enforced norm of official obedience to the law than we might think does not mean that this state of affairs
might not be in need of change. It also does not mean that more formal
institutions of punishment might not serve the function of changing this
state of affairs, at least insofar as these institutions punish officials who
break the law in the service of good aims. However, in numerous areas,
especially areas of constitutional law, there continues to be a reasonably
small number of incentives to law-following qua law-following. Although
we punish police officers for violating the Constitution, we hardly ever
punish prosecutors for initiating unconstitutional prosecutions, and we
never punish legislators for passing unconstitutional laws. In order to
explore this issue further, however, we need to switch standpoints, for now
we are looking at the question of obedience from the perspective of the
imposer of authority rather than the subject of authority. This changes the
analysis quite dramatically, as I will try to show in the following section.
III. THE ASYMMETRY OF OFFICIAL AUTHORITY
We have now backed into still another rarely asked question about
authority in general and legal authority in particular: how does authority
look not from the bottom but from the top? Are the arguments for and
against the imposition of authority merely the mirror image of the arguments for and against obedience to authority, such that if obedience to
authority is irrational or immoral, then so too is its imposition? Or is
authority asymmetric, making it possible simultaneously to condemn it
from the perspective of the subject while still understanding it from the
perspective of the imposer? I believe there is much to be said for the
latter position, and I will sketch the outlines of a defense of such an
argument.
As discussed in Part I, there is a widely held position pursuant to which
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the rational subject of an authority is justified in refusing to follow an
allegedly authoritative directive when the subject is convinced, all things
considered, that it is best not to follow the directive.4 8 But this conclusion
differs when one addresses the question from the point of view not of the
subject but of the imposer of authority. Suppose that the authority and the
subject simply disagree about the wisdom of following the directive of the
authority on some occasion. That is, suppose the imposer of authority is
just as convinced that, all things considered, a directive from the authority
to the subject should be followed as the subject is convinced that it should
be disregarded. In this case, it would make sense for the rational imposer
of authority to try to prevent noncompliance just as strenuously as the
subject would try not to comply.
Consider the following example. A parent tells her child that he should
go to bed tonight at 9:00 p.m. The child wants to stay up until 10:00 p.m.
to help a friend with her homework. Having considered his parent's
knowledge and experience, the child nevertheless concludes that it is
morally preferable to disobey his parent's authority. The parent, however,
is equally convinced that helping the friend is not nearly as beneficial to
the friend as the child thinks, and that disobeying on this occasion is more
likely to lead to future and less justified cases of noncompliance (the
"slippery slope" phenomenon) than the child supposes. The parent
therefore concludes that, all things considered, the child should go to bed
at 9:00 p.m. In this case it appears that noncompliance is morally justified
from the child's (subject of authority's) perspective, whereas compliance is
morally preferable from the parent's (imposer of authority's) perspective.
Thus, if compliance under these conditions by the child is indefensible
except as blind obedience, then so too is the parent's tolerating noncompliance indefensible except as equally blind acquiescence. Given that the
48. Throughout this article I have employed a heuristically truncated view of what should
be considered in any agent's all-things-considered judgment. Suffice it to say that I recognize that a sophisticated act-based decisionmaker will take into account in every case the
value of having legal rules for purposes of predictability, certainty, and the like. But even
though the value of rules, including rules of law, is part of the act-based decisionmaker's

calculus, that decisionmaker makes her own calculations about what value, if any, attaches to
following the rule on the particular occasion, and will not follow the rule if, taking everything
including rule-generating values into account, it is best on the particular occasion not to
follow it. See generally GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
(1986); Chaim Gans, MandatoryRules and ExclusionaryReasons, 15 PHILOSOPHIA 373 (1986);
Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 827 (1989); J.J.C.
Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,6 PHIL. Q. 344 (1956). Thus the question is not

one of whether the subject ignores the advantages of having legal rules, but of whether, as
the tradition of nonobedience would maintain, the value of having those rules is determined

by the subject in light of the decision the subject has to make, or on the other hand, as the
tradition of obedience would maintain, the value of having and following the rules is taken a
prioriby the subject.
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interesting questions of authority arise only in cases of disagreement
between authority and subject, we can see that in such cases the rational
authority is led to impose sanctions while the rational subject is led to
disobey.
Although the parent-child example contains a particular command, it
should be clear that nothing changes when we are dealing with a general
rule, except that the imposer of authority must make judgments about the
necessity of compliance on a wholesale basis in advance, rather than on a
retail basis for each case. So if a parent were convinced in advance that
the child was likely to substitute his own judgment for that of the parent on
a continuing basis, and that the consequences of such substitutions, in the
aggregate, would be worse than if no substitution occurred, the parent
would want to create an incentive system such that the child would be
highly reluctant to substitute his own judgment, even when that child
might think that it would be the best thing to do. In the case of legal
authority, therefore, this example suggests that even if from the perspective of the official as subject there is no obligation to obey the law qua law,
from the perspective of the official as imposer of authority there is good
reason to impose upon the subject a reason to act as if there were an
obligation to obey the law.49
When we are talking about the law, the role of "the authority" is filled
not only by the lawmaker, but also by the society that creates the norms
determining whether noncompliance with legal authority will be rewarded
or punished. In theory a society could determine, for the set of laws
directed to certain officials, or for the larger set of all laws directed to
officials, the expected consequences of any given degree of official interposition against the written law. This would involve knowing something
about the laws and something about the officials, of course, but a society
might determine, for its set of laws directed to officials, and for its set of
officials, that there was more of a worry about excess interposition (Fawn
Hall and Oliver North) than about excess obedience (Nuremberg and the
Fugitive Slave Laws). If a society were more concerned with excess
interposition, the analysis would deepen somewhat. We would then want
to determine the proportion and consequences of errors of unjustified
interposition and, conversely, errors of unjustified noninterposition, all

49. In reaching these conclusions I have benefitted greatly from numerous conversations

over the years with Larry Alexander. For some of his views on these subjects, see Larry
Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, 18 PHIL. Topics 5, 7-8 (1990); Larry Alexander,
The Gap, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695 (1991). For related views on these subjects, see
ROLF E. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS: A UTILITARIAN ACCOUNT

OF SOCIAL UNION AND THE RULE OF LAW 53-59 (1975).
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from the perspective of society as creator of the social and political norms
of official behavior.
Suppose, as an example of the kind of calculation required by this
analysis, that society as designer of the decisionmaking environment determined that for every one thousand cases in which the law prohibited an
official from taking some action, the official would, ideally, override the
authority of the law in 40 cases and obey the law in the other 960. But it
might also be estimated that if the officials were permitted to identify the
cases in which an override of the authority would be justified, the officials
would identify one hundred cases where an override of authority would be
justified. And suppose finally that thirty of those one hundred cases are
estimated to be the same cases identified by the designer of the environment as ones where officials' overrides would actually be justified. Thus,
from society's perspective, allowing officials to make the compliancenoncompliance calculation produces seventy errors of over-identification
and ten of under-identification.
Now suppose that an alternative procedure totally curtails officials from
making the determinations of whether an override of authority is justified,
say by mandating imprisonment for all officials violating the written law
regardless of the actual desirability of outcome of their doing so. Under
this procedure, none of the mistakes would be errors of over-identification,
because the sanctions for interposition would be so severe, but there
would still be forty mistakes of under-identification.
Although the calculus could be made more complex by assigning different values to different types of mistakes, thus requiring a calculation of
expected value, assume that all mistakes have the same social consequences.
If that is so, then the former procedure produces eighty mistakes and the
latter forty, which would make the latter procedure preferable even though
it identified no cases of desirable interposition.
This is a crude model, not only in that it assigns an equal value to all
mistakes, but also because it fails to discriminate among decisionmaking
environments. A better model would be more narrowly tailored, recognizing that some officials have more expertise than others (such as by comparing the expected competence of elected justices of the peace and judges of
the United States Courts of Appeals regarding technical legal matters),
some officials have more time than others, some officials operate within
different incentive structures than others, and so on. But the point here is
not to provide the best technical model possible. Rather it is to suggest a
framework for analysis that starts with the assumption that, given that
some bad laws exist and that some good laws will produce bad results, it
might be worthwhile to have officials empowered to eliminate bad results
some of the time. Starting with this assumption, we can imagine a degree of
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interpositional inclination that would produce the optimal number of
desirable interpositions. 50 If, for example, officials were slightly less reluctant to interpose than in the latter model described above, the one in
which interposition was strongly discouraged, but still more reluctant than
in the former model, the one in which permitting interposition produced
excess interposition, we might wind up with even fewer than forty errors.
Consequently, if we accept the asymmetry thesis, pursuant to which the
analysis of authority from the perspective of its imposer looks different
from the analysis from the perspective of the subject, then a society must
decide whether the degree of sanction it imposes for violations of law by
officials is consistent with the degree of reluctance it wants its officials to
have in deciding whether to "go above the written law." As explained
above, my sense is that this society presently strikes this balance pursuant
to a procedure under which ex post justified acts of disobedience to the
law on the part of officials are punished quite mildly, if at all, while ex post
unjustified acts of disobedience to the law are punished somewhat more
heavily than those same acts would have been punished merely for being
bad policy. If this is so, an official violating the law in the service of what
that official then thought to be the right, all things considered, result would
have some reason to pause and consider the severity of the punishment
before engaging in the act of interposition. In other words, it is possible
that the current incentive structure, one that tends not to punish (politically and legally) justified acts of interposition but that punishes unjustified
acts more if they are also unlawful, appears to encourage the official to be
quite sure when contemplating violation of the law.
This is hardly a bad structure, for it avoids the theoretically available but
practically difficult strategy of punishing people for justified violations of
the law. Yet by increasing the punishment when law violation turns out ex
post to have been unjustified, the current strategy induces more caution
than would be the case if the illegality were irrelevant to the political,
social, or legal sanction for having engaged in a bad act.
Like my previous questions, I do not purport to answer definitively the
questions of how much a society should control its officials, or of how
much it should use legal formality as a method of control. But it seems
50. There is a considerable amount of economics and law and economics literature
directed to the question of producing the optimal level of law enforcement. See, e.g., George
J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 532-33 (1970); Louis

Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement With Self-Reporting of Behavior (Mar.
10, 1992) (on file with The Georgetown Law Journal). In some respects I am suggesting that a
similar perspective might relate not only to how a particular agency achieves optimal
compliance with one set of laws, but also to how a society achieves the optimal number of
good results when that society uses laws as an indicator of good results, but is properly wary
of defining good results in terms of law-compliance.
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important to recognize that how, for example, a judge looks at this question is different from how those who empower or constrain judges look at
this question. Moreover, the question is different still when we are speaking not of judges but of administrative agencies, or police officers, or the
military. As I have attempted to show, the questions concerning authority
are numerous, and we will get no closer to answering any of them if we
assume that all of the important issues surrounding the concept of authority can be collapsed into one and only one question.
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